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THE ROLE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL IN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION-A POST-SCRIPT
EDWARD McWHINNEY*

In its Preamble, the Constitution of Canada speaks of the desire of the
Provinces of Canada to be "federally united into one Dominion under the
Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with a Constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom." Historically, then,
the Constitution of Canada like the Constitution of the United States, stems
from a compact between a number of different territorial units: the Provinces
of Lower Canada (Quebec), Upper Canada (Ontario), and the two eastern
maritime Provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brtnswick, joined together in
1867 to form the new Dominion of Canada, a number of other Provinces
having been admitted to the union since that time. Juridically speaking, however, the origins are rather different. The fundamental instrument in which
the Canadian Constitution is embodied, the British North America Act of
1867,1 is a statute of the United Kingdom Parliament, which calls attention
to the fact that though Canada in 1867 became a self-governing Dominion
within the then British Empire by virtue of the Act, her status for many
purposes internationally was still something less than a full sovereign state.
Although by 1931 the highly developed conventions governing the relationship
of the United Kingdom to the self-governing Dominions had crystallised into
the positive law rules of the Statute of Westminster, some vestiges of Canada's
former subordinate position still remained.
First, since the B.N.A. Act contains no provision as to its own amendment, constitutional change in Canada had perforce to be achieved by recourse to the original source of the Canadian Constitution, the United
Kingdom Parliament. The considerable number of amendments to the Canadian Constitution that have been effected since 1867 have been in the form
of Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament. Even today, when all political
parties are satisfied as to the desirability of some amending procedure that
can be operated by the Canadian people themselves, it is agreed that the exact
formula for amendment, a matter of some considerable controversy as yet,
must finally be emodied in an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament to become effective.2 This is indeed a full concession to the formalism of Austinian
jurisprudence.
*Barrister-at-Law, New South Wales Bar; Faculty of Law & Department of Polittical Science, Yale University.
1. 30 & 31 VicT., c. 3 (1867).
2. Livingston, Tile Amnending Power of the Canadian Parliament, 45 A,%r. POL.
Sci. REv. 437 (1951) ; Gerin-Lajoie, Dit pouvoir d'amendnient cons!illtionnel an Canada,
29 CAN. B. REv. 1136 (1951).
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A second important feature was that until the complete abolition of
such right in 19493 an appeal existed from the Canadian Supreme Court to
the Privy Council, the highest appellate tribunal of the British Empire, and
of the British Commonwealth which succeeded the British Empire. The role
that the Privy Council actually played in exercising ultimate judicial review
of the Canadian Constitution is perhaps the most controversial aspect of
4
Canadian constitutional history after the passage of the B.N.A. Act in 1867.
The system of government as finally provided for Canada under the
B.N.A. Act was a composite as opposed to a unitary system. The special
interests of the French inhabitants of Lower Canada and in particular of the
Roman Catholic Church had been recognised by the British Government
soon after the abandonment of France's colonial interests in North America
to the British, with the passage by the British Parliament of the Quebec Act
of 1774 with the guarantees for those interests that it contained. It was clear
in 1867 that a large degree of local autonomy was necessary, if the interests
of the French settlers and, for that matter, too, the special economic position
of the British settlers in the Maritime communities were to be protected. On
the other hand, the recent experience of the American Civil War was widely
considered in 1867 to point to the need for a strong government at the centre,
and the dangers of allowing too much power to be exercised at the periphery.
It seems clear that the intentions of the drafters of the Canadian Constitution were that the Doniinion Parliament's legislative powers should be of
paramount importance; that insofar as the system of government under the
B.N.A. Act was a federal system it should be a centralised federalism. 5 The
B.N.A. Act, as finally passed by the United Kingdom Parliament, establishes a distribution of legislative authority between the Dominion (or federal)
Government and the Provincial Governments, the purpose being to allocate
all powers of government between the two types of governing authority.
Unlike the United States Constitution, therefore, there are no legislative
powers which are denied to both federal and Provincial Governments-there
is no Canadian Bill of Rights.
As the Lord Chancellor, Lord Loreburn, said, "there can be no doubt
that under this organic instrument the powers distributed between the
Dominion on the one hand and the provinces on the other hand cover the
whole area of self-government within . . . Canada. It would be subversive
3. Supreme Court Act, 1949, 13 GEo. 6, c. 37, § 3, an Act of the Canadian Parliament.
The right of Canada so to abolish the appeal to the Privy Council had already been
upheld by the Privy Council, Att'y Gen. for Ontario v. Att'y Gen. for Canada, [1947]
A.C. 127 (P.C.).
4. See, e.g., a symposium on "Nationhood and the Constitution," in 29 CAN. B. REV.
1019-1197 (Dec. 1951).
5. MacDonald, The Constitution in a Changing World, 26 CAN. B. REv. 21 (1948).
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of the entire scheme and policy of the Act to assume that any point of internal self-government was withheld from Canada."6
Under Section 91 of the B.N.A. Act, the Dominion Government is
given a general power to make laws for the "Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of
Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces." Section 91 goes on to declare that "for greater Certainty, but not so as
to restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms," the legislative authority
of the Dominion Parliament shall extend to all matters coming within a
list of twenty-nine enumerated subjects. Under Section 92, on the other hand,
the Provincial legislatures are given exclusive legislative authority over a list
of sixteen subjects, of which perhaps the two most interesting from the constitutional viewpoint have been Section 92(13), "Property and Civil Rights
in the Province," and Section 92(16), "Generally all matters of a merely
local or private nature in the Province."
It seems clear that the general power conferred on the Dominion Parliament under Section 91 to make laws for the "Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada" was intended to be the major source of Dominion legislative
power, with the 29 specific heads of federal legislative power, enumerated in
Section 91, being merely illustrations of the general power. As Professor
Kennedy said, "The federal powers are wholly residuary for the simple reason
that the provincial powers are exclusive; and the twenty-nine "enumerations"
in Section 91 cannot add to the residue; they cannot take away from it....
They have no meaning except as examples of the residuary power, which
must be as exclusive as is the grant of legislative powers to the provinces.
The enumerated examples of the residuary power cannot occupy any special
place; they cannot be exalted at the expense of the residuary power, for that
would 'restrict the generality' of that power. It all looks reasonably simple,
and Sir John A. MacDonald was perhaps justified as he looked at the scheme
7
in hoping that 'all conflict of jurisdiction' had been avoided."
Certainly, by comparison with the United States Constitution it might
have been expected that Canada both by reason of the very precise delineation of the respective powers of the Dominion and the Provincial Governments and also of the absence of any formal Bill of Rights, would have been
spared the storms and battles that centered around the United States Constitution in the period from the Civil War up to the Court Revolution of 1937.
Instead we find a suprisingly parallel development, though in place of the
Due Process Clauses of the 5th and 14th Amendments, the conflict revolves
6. Att'y Gen. for Ontario v. Att'y Gen. for Canada, [1912] A.C. 571, 581 (P.C.).
7. Kennedy, The Interpretation of the British North America Act, 8 CAT&D. L.J.

146, 150 (1942).
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around an apparently simple choice in modes of judicial interpretationwhether the Constitution is to be regarded as an ordinary statute t8' be interpreted according to the ordinary rules of statutory construction, or whether
it is something more-a "constitutional statute'"-and therefore deserving
of more "beneficial" interpretation than the normal rules of statutory construction might allow. The judicial approach to the interpretation of the
Canadian Constitution has fluctuated widely between these two alternative
approaches, and the fluctuations tend to accord with two and possibly three
basic time periods.
In the first period from the passing of the B.N.A. Act in 1867 until the
middle 1890's, the Privy Council, as final appellate court in Canadian con-stitutional cases was disposed to construe the legislative powers of the
Dominion Parliament broadly, and in particular to concede full value to the
Dominion Government's general power under Section 91 to legislate for the
"Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada.""
The second period, beginning about 1896 and lasting generally right up
to the present day, is notable for the contraction of Dominion legislative
powers, and the concomitant assertion of Provincial rights. Under Lord
Watson, and also under Lord Haldane, his spiritual successor, the Dominion's
general legislative power under Section 91 is cut down by deference to the
heads of Provincial power enumerated in Section 92-the Dominion cannot
legislate under the general power in Section 91 where the effect is to "trench"
upon the provincial classes of subjects." Lord Haldane, indeed, went even
further than Lord Watson and enunciated the so-called "emergency" doctrine
under which the Dominion's legislative power under Section 91 was confined
to use in periods of national emergency, such as war, famine or pestilence.' 0
Further, the Dominion's power under Section 132 to legislate to implement the obligations of Canada or any Province "as part of the British Empire . . . arising under Treaties between the Empire and such Foreign
countries," was held not to cover obligations entered into by Canada herself
in her new status as an international person,"' this notwithstanding that the
8. Russell v. The Queen, 7 App. Cas. 829, 839 (1882). Per Sir Montague E. Smith:
"Few, if any, laws could be made by Parliament for the peace, order, and good government of Canada which did not in some incidental way affect property and civil rights;
and it could not have been intended, when assuring to the provinces exclusive legislative
authority on the subjects of property and civil rights, to exclude the Parliament from the
exercise of this general power whenever any such incidental interference would result
from it."
9. Att'y Gen. for Ontario v. Att'y Gen. for Canada, [1896] A.C. 348 (P.C.), per
Lord Watson. See also Lord Watson's decision in Tennant v. Union Bank, [1894] A.C.
31 (P.C.).
10. In re Board of Commerce Act, [1922] 1 A.C. 191 (P.C.) ; Toronto Electric
Commisioners v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396 (P.C.).
11. Att'y Gen. for Canada v. Att'y Gen. for Ontario, [1937] A.C. 326 (P.C.).
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Privy Council expressly took notice of the constitutional developments in
12
Dominion status since the enactment of the B.N.A. Act.

Even the Dominion Government's head of power over the "regulation of
trade and commerce,"' 3 a power which has proved so fertile a source of
federal legislative authority in the United States, was deprived of any real
significance. Lord Haldane went so far as to rule in the Board of Commerce
case' 4 that the trade and commerce power was available only to "aid" the
Dominion in an exceptional situation to exercise the powers conferred by
the general language of Section 91; that where no power was possessed by
the Dominion Parliament independently of the trade and commerce section,
the trade and commerce section could not operate. So low indeed did the
trade and commerce power fall that Chief Justice Anglin of the Canadian
Supreme Court was moved to protest that it had been "denied all efficacy as
an independent enumerative head of Dominion legislative jurisdiction ..
Although this second period cannot yet be regarded as having come to an
end, there is a trend of decisions from the 1930's onwards which may represent something more than the mere working out of the dialectic. Thus Lord
Sankey declared in the Persons case in 1930: "The [B.N.A.] Act planted
in Canada a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural
limits. The object of the Act was to grant a Constitution to Canada ...
Their Lordships do not conceive it to be the duty of this Board-it is certainly
not their desire-to cut down the provisions of the Act by a narrow and
technical construction, but rather to give it a large and liberal interpretation.
MG.,,O
It is true that Lord Sankey rather cut down the sweep of his coniments by going on to add that in making his remark's he was not considering
the question of the respective legislative competence of the Dominion and
of the Provinces under Sections 91 and 92 of the Act. But in British Coal
Corporation v. The King,17 Lord Sankey, in upholding the right of the
Dominion Parliament to abolish appeals from Canadian Courts to the Privy
Council in criminal cases, quoted his own remarks in the Persons case but
without the caveat as to Sections 91 and 92, and expressly recognised that
"in interpreting a constituent or organic statute such as the [B.N.A.] Act,
that construction most beneficial to the widest possible amplitude of its powers
12. "While it is true . . . that it was not contemplated
in 1867 that the Dominion
would possess treaty-making powers, it is impossible to strain the section so as to cover
the uncontemplated event." Per Lord Atkin, in Att'y Gen. for Canada v. Att'y Gen. for
Ontario, [1937] A.C. 326, 350 (P.C.). See also In re Regulation and Control of Radio
Communication, [1932] A.C. 304 (P.C.).
13. Section 91(2).
14. In re Board of Commerce Act, [19221 1 A.C. 191 (P.C.).
15. The King v. Eastern Terminal Elevator Co., [1925] S.C.R. 434, 442.
16. Edwards v. Att'y Gen. for Canada, [1930] A.C. 124, 136 (P.C.).
17. [1935] A.C. 500 (P.C.).
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must be adopted."'
It was in the tradition laid down by Lord Sankey in
these two cases that the Privy Council in 1947 approached the question of the
legislative competence of the Dominion Parliament to abolish altogether appeals from Canadian Courts to the Privy Council, in all classes of cases. Although the case did not directly concern Sections 91 and 92 of the B.N.A.
Act, but principally Section 101 of the Act, the Privy Council approached
most boldly the task of signing its own death warrant so far as Canadian appellate jurisdiction was concerned. "It is . . . irrelevant that the question is
one that might have seemed unreal at the date of the [B.N.A.] Act. To such
an organic statute the flexible interpretation must be given which changing
circumstances require ..
It might be unwise to make too much of these few decisions. Thus, even
while Lord Atkin was giving the Privy Council Appeals case decision, Lord
Wright in the Japanese Canadians case 20 was apparently re-affirming Lord
Haldane's "emergency" theory2' of the Dominion's general legislative power
under Section 91, even though only the previous year Lord Simon had thrown
cold water on the emergency doctrine. 22 Still, if the Canadian Supreme
Court, in its capacity of final arbiter of the interpretation of the B.N.A. Act,
now that the appeal to the Privy Council has been finally abolished, wishes
to chart out a liberal course of interpretation of Dominion legislative powers,
Lord Sankey's "living tree" metaphor is available as a doctrinal justification
23
for this.
Necessarily, most of the controversy as to the role played by the Privy
Council centres around the period from 1896 onwards, and the judicial
personalities of Lord Watson and Lord Haldane. 24 In treating the B.N.A.
18. Id. at 518.
19. Per Lord Atkin, Att'y Gen. for Ontario v. Att'y Gen. for Canada, [1947] A.C.
127, 154 (P.C.) (reference re Privy Council Appeals).
20. Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians v. Att'y Gen. for Canada, [1947]

A.C. 87 (P.C.).

21. As enunciated in Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 193

(P.C.).

22. Att'y Gen. for Ontario v. Canada Temperence Federation, [1946] A.C. 193

(P.C.).

23. As the antithesis to Lord Sankey's "living tree," we have Lord Atkin's 'ship
of state."

"While the ship of state now sails on larger ventures and into foreign

waters she still retains the watertight compartments which are an essential part of her
original structure."

Per Lord Atkin in Att'y Gen. for Canada v. Att'y Gen. for Ontario,

[19371 A.C. 326, 354 (P.C.).

24. "Since . . . the privy council has treated the B.N.A. Act 'as an ordinary statute
and not as a constitutional document, it has given no consideration to the intention of the
'fathers,' but has adhered to the view that the 'intention of parliament' must be interpreted as laid down in the act itself, in the words and context of' which alone its
meaning must be discovered.... The use of extraneous evidence has ben eschewed, and
the board has sought the meaning of the act in the text, 'aided only by the flickering
illumination afforded by rules of textual construction evolved with respect to ordinary
statutes.'" Tuck, Canada and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 4 U. oF
ToRoNro L.J. 33, 40 (1941).
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Act as an ordinary statute without regard to the intentions of the "fathers"
of the Constitution, the Privy Council after 1896 reached a "result which the
historian knows to be untrue," 25 and a Constitution which "(rightly or
wrongly) embodied a Centralized Federalism in which Dominion legislative
power was of paramount importance ... has yielded a Decentralized Federalism in terms of legislative power; and one, moreover, that is ill-adapted to
present needs."

'26

Professor MacDonald has collected an impressive list of Dominion social
and economic legislation held invalid as encroaching upon Provincial powers
under Sections 92(13) and 92(16) or otherwise beyond the powers of the
Dominion Parliament.2 7 It does not, it seems, require a Bill of Rights or a
Due Process Clause for natural law concepts as to the proper sphere of
governmental activity to operate in the field of constitutional law.
Granted the premise that the B.N.A. Act is to be treated as an ordinary
statute, and not as a "constitutional" statute, do the Privy Council decisions
flow inevitably from the words of the B.N.A. Act? Professor Kennedy seems
convinced that any hope that effect would be given to the intentions of the
framers of the Act was doomed to disappointment. The study of those intentions may be interesting, but it is of no value except in showing the futility of
Privy Council's
the hope that the intentions and statute will accord. The
28
game."
legal
the
of
"rules
the
with
approach is in accord
25. Smith, 9 J. ComP. LEG. & INT'L L. 160 (1927), quoted in Tuck, supra note 24,
at 40, 41.
26. MacDonald, The Constitution in a Changing World, 26 CAN. B. REV. 21, 44
(1948).
27. MacDonald, supra note 26. The list includes the following: Legislation for the
abolition of the liquor traffic, Att'y Gen. for Ontario v. Att'y Gen. for Dominion, [1896)
A.C. 348 (P.C.) ; for the regulation of "through traffic" over Provincial and Dominion
railways, Montreal v. Montreal Street Ry., [19121 A.C. 333 (P.C.); prohibiting trade
combinations and hoarding and regulating the sale and fixation of prices of commodities,
In re Board of Commerce Act, [19221 A.C. 191 (P.C.) ; for the regulation of the grain
trade of Canada and of the business of those who deal in grain as warehousemen, etc.,
Eastern Terminal Elevator Co. v. The King, [1925) S.C.R. 434; regulating sales and
deliveries of eggs within a province, R. v. Zaslavsky, [1935] 2 W.W.R. 34, (19351 2
D.L.R. 788, 64 C.C.C. 706 (Sask.) ; R. v. Thorsby Traders Ltd., [1935] 3 W.W.R. 475, 65
C.C.C. 109 (Alta.); R. v. Brodsky, 43 Man. R. 522, (19361 1 W.W.R. 177, [1936)
1 D.L.R. 578, 65 C.C.C. 4, for the regulation of individual forms of trade within a
province such as marketing transactions in natural products having no connection with
interprovincial or external trade, Att'y Gen. for British Columbia v. Att'y Gen. for
Canada, [1937] A.C. 377; for the validation of agreements between persons in an
industry as to competition in a trade within a province, In re Trade and Industry Act,
[19361 S.C.R. 379; cf. Att'y Gen. for Ontario v. Att'y Gen. for Canada, [1937] A.C.
405; regulating the licensing of fish canneries and the trade processing of fish, Att'y Gen.
for Canada v. Att'y Gen. for British Columbia, [1930) A.C. 111; and legislation for
regulation of business of non-Dominion insurance companies, see MacDonald, The Regnlation of Insurance in Canada, 24 CAN. B. REV. 257 (1946) ; legislation for the prevention of strikes and lock-outs and the settlement of industrial disputes between employers
and employees, Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396, legislation
relating to weekly rest, minimum wages and limitation of hours of labour, Att'y Gen.
for Canada v. Att'y Gen. for Ontario, [1937] A.C. 326.
28. Kennedy, The Constitution of Canada, 2 POLITIcA 356 (1937).
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"After a careful examination of every case, in every jurisdiction, dealing with the interpretation of the Act, I venture to submit that in not one of
them has the ratio decidendi depended on reasons external to the Act. . .. So
generally uniform has been the approach of the judicial committee that, on
the basis of it, I anticipated almost all these judgments except that on unemployment insurance, before their subject-matters were referred to the
29
Supreme, Court, and thence to London."
But other commentators are not so certain as to the inevitability of
the course of the Privy Council's decisions. Indeed, Professor Laskin goes
so far as not merely to repudiate any idea of inevitability, but to assert "if
anything, [the course of decisions] indicates conscious and deliberate choice of
a policy .which required, for its advancement, manipulations which can only
30
with difficulty be represented as ordinary judicial techniques."
Ultimately, to appraise the Privy Council's work, we must face up
squarely to the question of whether judges legislate, in the sense of making
conscious choices between conflicting policy alternatives. Although since the
Court Revolution of 1937, few in the United States would hesitate to answer
this question in the affirmative, the theory of the judicial slotmachine is still
powerful in a country whose jurisprudence is dominated, as Canada's is, by
the worst rigours of Austinian formalism. 3 ' It is not without significance that
the controversy over the Privy Council's interpretation for the B.N.A. Act
should all too frequently proceed in the form of a dispute over alternative rules
of statutory construction, rather than in terms of the actual consequences to
Canadian national life flowing from the individual decisions.
The need for a critical examination of the values employed by judges
in making their decisions has been obscured all too frequently by much
unproductive wrangling over the formulae in which the judges subsequently
embody those values, although the varied members of the Privy Council
have occasionally adverted directly to the consequences of their decisions.
Thus Lord Haldane, in summing up in 1923 the work of his predecessor and
mentor Lord Watson paid eloquent tribute--"As a result of a long series of
decisions, Lord Watson put clothing upon the bones of the Constitution,
and so covered them over with living flesh that the Constitution of Canada
took a new form. The Provinces were recognised as of equal authority
co-ordinate with the Dominion, and a long series of decisions were given
by him which solved many problems, and produced a new contentment in
KENNEDY, THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA, 550 (2d ed. 1938).
30. Laskin, "Peace, Order and Good Government" Re-examined, 25 CAN. B.
1054, 1086 (1947).
31. See, e.g., the controversy over the Canadian Wheat Board case, Notes, 29
B. REv. 296 (1951), 29 CAN. B. REV. 572 (1951).

29.

REV.
CAN.
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Canada with the Constitution they had got in 1867. It is difficult to say
32
what the extent of the debt was that Canada owes to Lord Watson.1
It may be, indeed, that seen against a background of developing Canadian
nationhood, the Privy Council's work is not entirely deserving of censure.
The period from the passing of the B.N.A. Act in 1867 until 1896, represented
in the judicial arena by the Privy Council decision in Russell v. The Qiteen'"
favouring a broad interpretation of Dominion powers even at the expense
of the Provinces, coincides with the dominance in the legislative arena of
Sir John A. MacDonald and the Conservative Party. This is the era of the
"moving frontiers," when the settlers advanced ever Westward and into the
North, when the railway is pushed across the Continent, and new Provinces are
progressively admitted to the Canadian Confederation as the settlers'. frontiers
extend. It is a period when a strong centralised administration can aid and
foster this expansion.
The period from 1896 onwards, however, when first of all Lord Watson
and then Lord Haldane and his successors, restricted Dominion powers in
favour of Provincial rights, is the period of the substantial political dominance
of the Liberal Party of Laurier and Mackenzie King, which rested for its
Parliamentary majority (as the Conservative Party never did) upon the
French as well as the English voting population. It was a period introduced,
appropriately enough, by the Manitoba education crisis when Laurier
(a French Catholic himself) sacrificed short-range French Catholic interests
in separate schools for the French Catholic minority in the Province of
Manitoba for the long-range safeguard to French Catholic Quebec of the
autonomy of Provincial administrations as against interference by the Dominion Government. This is what Professor Kennedy, appropriately enough,
has hailed as an "experiment in sovereignty . . . a serious contribution to

the destruction of the Austinian idea. Every province is from one point of
view at least-in relation to the federal government-an example of a group
'3 4
with a life and purpose of its own."
What I am saying is that whilst one may suspect at times in the United
States that states' rights are being raised merely as a protective umbrella
under which economic special interests may shelter,3 5 this plea may frequently
32. Haldane, The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 1 CA1m. L.J. 143, 150
(1923). This concern for provincial autonomy runs through Lord Watson's seminal
opinion upon the Dominion Government's general legislative power under § 91, Att'y
Gen. for Ontario v. Att'y Gen. for Canada, [1896) A.C. 348 (P.C.), especially at 360;
and we find it expressed again as late as 1937 in Lord Atkin's judgment on Canada's
treaty-implementing power under § 132, Att'y Gen. for Canada v. Att'y Gen. for Ontario, [1937] A.C. 326 (P.C.) (hours of labour case).
33. 7 App. Cas. 829 (1882).
34. KENNEDY, THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA 431 (2d ed. 1938).
35. Thus in JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 21 (1941), the
author comments upon Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 Sup. Ct. 855, 80 L. Ed.
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spring in Canada from some more deeply-rooted claim for the treatment of
a problem at the local level. The existence in Canada of two distinct racial
groups differing radically in language, religion and social customs, points
to the existence of two distinct "living laws" within the Canadian nation,
perhaps requiring a more pluralist organisation of national life with a large
degree of policy-making located at the periphery rather than at the centre.36
Nor has the interdiction of the Dominion Government's social and economic
planning legislation necessarily created a complete legislative no-man's land
in these matters-for example, although the field of labour law seems effectively barred to the Dominion Government,3 7 most of the Provinces have in
fact legislated in this field.3 8 And there is also considerable scope for legislative co-operation between the Dominion Government and the Provinces,
though the difficulties here should not be underestimated.3 9 The special
position of the French Canadians and the Catholic Church has been recognised
by the United Kingdom Government as early as 1774 with the passage of the
Quebec Act. The denominational schools in the Provinces were given special
protection under Section 93 of the B.N.A. Act. Even the invalidation by the
Privy Council of the Canadian "New Deal" legislation introduced by the
Conservative Government of Mr. R. B. Bennett, (which seems to have
aroused more ire among the critics than anything else) 40 was largely an
academic question, at the time when the decisions were given. The Conservative Government had been defeated at the general elections, and it was Mr.
Mackenzie King's Liberal Government which had referred its predecessor's
legislation to the courts for an opinion.
It may be that the beginning of a new favouring of Dominion legislative
powers, as evidenced in Lord Sankey's "living tree" doctrine and the cases
which followed it, presages a new trend to centralisation in a world rapidly
1160 (1936) : "Seven states appeared and joined with the Federal Government in support
of the Act-no state appeared against it. Nevertheless the Court spoke of the danger

of the states. being 'despoiled of their powers' and being reduced to 'little more than

geographical sub-divisions of the national domain.'"
36. See the recent plea for "Provincial autonomy" raised by a French-Canadian
jurist, Pigeon, The Meaning of ProvincialAutonomy, 29 CAN. B. REv. 1126, 1134 (1951):
"[It is wrong to assume that the same laws are suitable for all peoples. On the
contrary, laws have a cultural aspect; hence due consideration should be given in
framing them to the charcter, condition and beliefs of those for whom they are made.
Autonomy is designed for the very purpose of meeting this requirement. The Frenchspeaking population of the province of Quebec is obviously the group of Canadian
citizens specially interested in it. For them autonomy is linked up with the preservation
of their way of life." For a contrary viewpoint, see Scott, Centralisation and Decentralisation in Canadian Federalism, 29 CAN. B. REv. 1095 (1951).
37. Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, [19251 A.C. 396 (P.C.).
38. See MacDonald, The Constitution in a Changing World, 26 CAN. B. REv. 21, 44
(1948), and further examples there listed.
39. Id. at 39-40.
40. See especially Kennedy, The Interpretation of the British North America
Act, 8 CAMB. L.J. 154 (1943) ; Kennedy, The British North American Act:
Past and Future, 15 CAN. B. RFv. 393 (1937) ; MacDonald, The Canadian Constitution
Seventy Years After, 15 CAN. B. REv. 401 (1937) ; Tuck, supra note 24.
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shrinking under pressure of external events. But again, the situation can
be overstated. If Lord Watson and Lord Haldane were consciously and
overtly influenced in their approach to the interpretation of the B.N.A. Act
by a bias in favour of Provincial powers, their approach seems nevertheless
to have been a vague, impressionistic one, without the benefit of a detailed
analysis and weighing of the policy alternatives involved in each case. 41 And
with these two exceptions, the composition of the Privy Council Boards sitting
on Canadian constitutional cases has been so varied and so changing as to
make, even with the best of intentions, for only a piecemeal or erratic exertion
of legislative power on the part of the judges. 42 In any case, where the
history of judicial review in the United States from the Civil War onwards,
indicates how readily conservatively-minded judges could accommodate a Constitution to the demands of corporate enterprise to be free from governmental
regulation, the history of the Privy Council's interpretation of the Constitutions of Dominions other than Canada is also evidence that the traditional
common law hostility to statute law 43 can lend itself easily to the maintenance
44
of political laissez-faire.
What of the future? With the final abolition of the appeal from Canadian Courts to the Privy Council, the Canadian Supreme Court is left as
final arbiter as to the meaning of the B.N.A. Act. What will the Canadian
judges do? The decisions of the Privy Council on the B.N.A. Act, coming
to the Privy Council as they did on appeal from the Canadian Supreme Court,
41. Laskin suggests, indeed, that Lord Haldane's views on the B.N.A. Act may have
been influenced by his long apprenticeship at the Bar as counsel for the Provinces of
Canada in at least ten Privy Council cases. He is careful to add that Lord Haldane
also made several appearances for the Dominion Government. Laskin, "Peace, Order and
Good Government" Re-examined, 25 CAN. B. REv. 1054, 1055 (1947).
42. See Scott, The Consequences of the Privy Council Decisions, 15 CAN. B. REv.
485, 493 (1937) ; MacDonald, The Canadian Constitution Seventy Years After, 15 CAN.
B. REv. 401, 427 (1937).
43. Thus Amos, The Interpretationof Statutes, 5 CAMB. L.J. 163, 173 (1934), speaks
of the "appropriate and specific adjustment of his mind" which the English judge makes
when he finds himself confronted by a statute. See also FRIEDMANN, LEGAL TIIEOny
295 (1st ed. 1944).
44. Incidentally, KENNEDY, THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA (2d ed. 1938), is in
error in maintaining at 405-06, "The Australian High Court maintains that the Australian
Constitution cannot be subject to the ordinary rules governing a British statute, which
must be modified by the conception of the Constitution in the minds of the founders of
the Commonwealth." This was substantially the position up to 1920, but the decision by
the High Court of Australia in the Engineers' case in that year [Amalgamated Society
of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co., Ltd., 28 C.L.R. 109 (1920)], established the
pattern of interpretation for the Commonwealth Constitution that the High Court and
Privy Council have followed since that time, that the Constitution is a British statute to
be interpreted according to normal (restrictive) rules of statutory construction. Professor Laskin, also, seems somewhat to have overemphasized the influence of Americait
precedents in Australian constitutional jurisprudence. Thus Laskin, The Supreme Court
of Canada: A Final Court of and for Canadians, 29 CAN. B. REV. 1038, 1045 (1951):
"It is a paradox that Australia, which is more 'English' than Canada and less 'American', has been influenced more by 'American' decisions and less by 'English' decisions."
And again, Laskin refers somewhat wistfully to the "absence in Canada of independent
judicial tradition like that in Australia."
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do not differ very substantially from decisions of the Canadian Supreme
Court in the first instance. 45 Professor Kennedy is at some pains to absolve
the Canadian Supreme Court judges from any share of responsibility for
the Privy Council's decisions. "The Supreme Court is bound by the judgments of the Privy Council, and it must profess to follow them to the best
of its ability. The generality of judicial methods observed by the judicial
committee almost made the decisions of the supreme court inevitable.1 4 This
view is, however, strongly challenged by Professor Laskin. Although it is
true that Chief Justice Anglin indicated opposition to the Watson-Haldane
viewpoint, 47 the views of Chief Justice Sir Lyman Duff48 are "not solely
the result of the compulsion of Privy Council decisions. The 'locus classicus'
accolade bestowed by the Privy Council [in 1937] on [Duff's] judgment in
the Natural Products Marketing Act reference 49 may, in part, have been
merely a self-serving tribute to a skilful and faithful exposition of its own
course of decision but Sir Lyman showed, as early as the Board of Commerce
case [in 1920], 50 that he had embarked on that course as much by his own
choice as by the dictate of stare decisis."51
Even in Australia where the categories of constitutional matters that may
be appealed to the Privy Council are limited by the Constitution 52 and the
final appellate jurisdiction of the High Court of Australia has therefore always been considerable, it may be questioned whether any marked pattern of
divergence has appeared between the type of decisions given by the High
Court on the one hand and the Privy Council on the other.
Some Canadian authorities fear that the weight of Privy Council decisions may be so heavy upon the Canadian judges, as to leave them no freedom
of action for the future, even now that the appeal to the Privy Council has
been finally abolished; that the only way of getting around the past may
be direct constitutional amendment. 53 But such a proposal ignores the fact
45. But Scott, The Privy Council and Minority Rights, 37 QUEEN'S QUARTERLY 668
(1930), assails the "myth" that the Privy Council has been more impartial than the
Canadian Supreme Court on matters of minority rights. And as to this point, see also
MacDonald, The Privy Council and the Canadian Constitution, 29 CAN. B. REV. 1021,
1031 (1951) : "It is history that, contrary to Lord Carnarvon's hopes, the Privy Council
has not been a protector of minorities so much as it has been a protector of the provinces ... "
46. KENNEDY, THE CONSTITUTION OF- CANADA 550 (2d ed. 1938).

47. See especially In re Board of Commerce Act, 60 S.C.R. 456 (1920) ; The King
v. Eastern Terminal Elevator Co., [1925] S.C.R. 434.
48. See Att'y Gen. for Canada v. Att'y Gen. for Ontario, [1937] A.C. 326 (P.C.).
49. In re Natural Products Marketing Act, [1936] S.C.R. 398.
50. In re Board of Commerce Act, 60 S.C.R. 456 (1920).
51. Laskin, "Peace, Order and Good Government" Re-examined, 25 CAN. B. REv.
1054, 1056 (1947) ; see also Laskin, The Supreme Court of Canada: A Final Court of
and for Canadians,29 CAN. B. REv. 1038, 1057 et seq. (1951).
52. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA CONSTITUTION § 74.

53. IENNEDY, THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA 550-51 (2d ed. 1938); Kennedy The
British North America Act: Past and Future, 15 CAN. B. REv. 393, 399 (1937) ; Mac-
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that the Constitution, even when amended, will still be subject to judicial
interpretation. If, as Professor Laskin has suggested, 4 there was nothing
that was inevitable in the interpretations that were in fact made of the B.N.A.
Act, it may be that no amount of amendments will avail if the judges do not
want it so. Similarly I think Laskin's suggestion that members of the Canadian Supreme Court should, in the future, exercise to the full their privilege of
writing separate opinions in constitutional cases, nr grasps at the form rather
than at the substance. Even if they do not care to overrule a previous decision, common law judges have developed a real facility in "distinguishing"
unwanted precedents; and the decisions of the Privy Council upon the B.N.A.
Act make even the use of a device such as this unnecessary. For a strict
holding as to Dominion legislative powers and a corresponding enlargement
of the sphere of Provincial powers, to which, certainly, the bulk of the decisions point, Lord Atkin's marine metaphor58 is available for invocation; for
a broad, beneficial construction of Dominion Powers, Lord Sankey's arboreal
58
metaphor 5 7 is the magic formula.
It may, in fact, be a matter of changing the judges rather than of
changing the Constitution. Whatever the excellence of the decisions of
the judges of the Privy Council in the field of private law, there has been,
perhaps, a certain rigidity and inflexibility in the approach of those same
judges to public law questions-a product no doubt of the autonomous training and traditions of the legal profession in England and the Commonwealth,
with the widespread emphasis on case-law.59 It will be interesting to see how
the present judges of the Canadian Supreme Court, iecruited -as they were
for a jurisdiction that was substantially private-law at the time of their
-appointment, will adjust themselves to their new and extra public-law responsibilities, now that the Canadian Supreme Court is the final appellate
court in constitutional matters. The frank acceptance of the essentially policymaking role of a Supreme Court exercising judicial review under a written
Donald, The Constitution in a Changing World, 26 CAN. B. REV. 21, 45 (1948): MacDonald, The Canadian Constitution Seventy Years Aftcr, 15 CAN. B. REV. 401, 425
(1937).
54. Laskin, "Peace, Order and Good Government" Re-examined, 25 CAN. 1. REV.
1054, 1086 (1947).
55. Ibid. It must be noted that Laskin seems now more hopeful that the Canadian
Supreme Court, as the final Canadian appellate court, might be persuaded to reverse
itself, Laskin, The Supreme Court of Canada: A Final Court of and for Canadianls, 29
CAN. B. REV. 1038, 1069 et seq. (1951).
56. Per Lord Atkin, Att'y Gen. for Canada v. Att'y Gen. for Ontario, [1937] A.C.
326 (P.C.).
57. Per Lord Sankey, in the Persons case, Edwards v. Att'y Gen. for Canada,
[1930] A.C. 124, 136 (P.C.).
58. The situations where two lines of conflicting decisions, each line yielding a
different result in the instant case, are available to the judges, have been classed as
legal categories of competing reference, fallacies of the logical form. STONE, TIIE
PROVINCE AND FuNcTIoN OF LAw 176 (1946).
59. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 295 (1st ed. 1944).

1952]

CANADIAN CONSTITUTION

and rigid Constitution, has led in the United States, especially since the
Court Revolution of 1937, to a very broad basis of selection for Supreme
Court justices, in which considerations of competence in purely technical
legal questions play a lesser, (one might almost say a minor-) role; and in
which the opportunity may be taken, through the working of the Constitutional requirement of Senate confirmation of nominees to judicial office,
to scrutinise very closely the background and the value preferences of the
candidates for judicial appointment. Canadian Governments have, right
from the outset, recognised the importance of regional and sectional factors
in making appointments to the Canadian Supreme Court,6 0 and it will be
interesting to see whether, in the future, Canada also follows the United States
pattern in looking beyond the closed ranks of the leaders of the Bar for future
Supreme Court material. In that case we may yet see a law professor or
two gracing the Canadian Supreme Court Bench.
The main task for the future however, will be to develop in Canada
an informed body of opinion capable of appraising and criticising the decisions of the judges as they are handed down. There is, as yet, a real
shortage of high calibre law journals capable of undertaking such a rolethis, indeed, is a condition unfortunately common to all of the common law
countries outside the United States. Yet legal education in Canada is at last
breaking away from the fetters of professional control 61 and far-reaching
changes, therefore, may not be long in coming.
One product of Canada's colonial heritage is a certain healthy disrespect
for constituted authority. Thus, a leading journal some years back greeted
the appointment of a new Governor-General for Canada with the following
pungent comment: "None of the Cavendishes has ever been remarkable for
brilliance and only one for genius. . . . The Cavendish type is strong and
virile and clean and hard-working, but rarely brilliant. . . . He [the Duke]

does not overpower with his brilliance, nor is his intellect an amazingly bright
62
one, but he has a pleasing manner.
Some of the same frankness directed at the Canadian Supreme Court
judges and their work would go a long way to develop a distinctively Canadian constitutional jurisprudence.
60. For example, the Supreme Court Act, 1875 § 4, provided that two judges out of

a Bench of six should come from Quebec. The Supreme Court Act of 1949, in addition
to its main task of abolishing the appeal to the Privy Council, increased the Court membership to nine judges, and at the same time provides that one third of these judges
shall come from Quebec. See generally Laskin, The Supreme Court of Canada: A
Final Court of and for Canadians,29 CAN. B. Rv. 1038, 1041 (1951).
61. See Wright, Should the Professiom Control Legal Education? 3 J. LEGAL EDUC.
1 (1950).
62. THE CANADIAN MAGAZINE 308, 312 (Feb. 1917), quoted in DAWSON, THE
PRINCIPLE OF OFFICIAL INDEPENDENCE 217 (1922).

